Abstract: Payments systems have grown considerably and have become increasingly complex, prompting regulators to reassess their roles and renewing interest in historical experiences with payments systems. In this paper, I study the Banco Central System of Mexico, which was a bank note par redemption and clearing system for other payments that operated in Mexico City from 1899 until 1913. I first describe the origins of the Banco Central System. I then consider whether it became prone to behavioral problems, as some observers contended. I find that although Banco Central was less well-positioned to address incentive problems relative to one of its counterparts in the United States (the Suffolk Bank of Boston), it did act to constrain bank behavior. However, considerable government intervention weakened the disciplinary role of Banco Central and thus made the system more prone to collapse.
1 The Federal Reserve Board (The Rivlin Committee) has recently undertaken the task of reassessing its role in payments systems (see statement by Vice-Chair Alice Rivlin in the November 1997 Federal Reserve Bulletin).
I. Introduction
Over the past decade, payments systems have grown considerably and have become increasingly complex, prompting regulators to reassess their roles.
1 Two controversial issues that have arisen are to what extent self-regulation can supplant government regulation and supervision and how well a completely private system could cope in times of stress. These questions have prompted some to take a closer look at historical experiences in banking. With respect to private payments systems involving bank currencies, or bank notes, at least two of them appear to have worked very well with minimal government intervention: the note exchange system that developed in Scotland during eighteenth century (White 1984, Cowen and Kroszner 1989) and the Suffolk Bank System of New England in the early nineteenth century ( Mullineaux 1987, Calomiris and Kahn 1996) .
In this paper, I study a Mexican bank note redemption and payments system that was not considered successful. It started in 1899, when Banco Central Mexicano (Banco Central for short) received a federal charter to be, in part, the Mexico City correspondent for certain banks.
Banco Central redeemed member bank notes for specie (gold or silver coin) at par and acted as their agent in the clearing of other payments. Because of Banco Central's role in the arrangement, I call it the Banco Central System (BCS). The BCS lasted until 1913, two years after the revolution began.
The Mexican banking system of the early 1900s was far from, as Selgin and White (1994 p. 1718 ) put it, a "pure laissez faire monetary regime". Throughout the late nineteenth century, Mexico's largest bank, Banco Nacional de Mexico, had a close relationship with the federal 2 2 Federal government banking records (Memorias de las Instituciones de Credito) was the main source of information for this study. It contains bank charters, shareholders' annual reports, reports from federal bank inspectors, correspondence between the federal government and banks, and other information. government and enjoyed special privileges that helped shield it from competition. Even after barriers to entry into banking were relaxed in 1896, entry continued to be restricted for banks of issue (i.e., those that were allowed to issue demandable notes). The experience with the BCS nonetheless greatly altered the prevailing attitude in Mexico concerning the desirability of privately controlled payments systems. The belief that fraud or mismanagement was a serious problem rationalized the creation of a government-owned central bank and the banning of private bank notes.
Below, I describe the origins of the BCS and trace its experiences to its demise. I then take a closer look at the BCS. According to Manero (1957) , Banco Central failed to act in ways that would have ensured the viability of the system. I find, however, that Banco Central did act to constrain the behavior of member banks. At least, it did so initially, but government intervention in the system muted Banco Central's effectiveness as a source of bank discipline. I conclude that government meddling with the system made it more prone to behavioral problems than otherwise would have been the case.
II. Background 2
For several decades after Mexico's independence from Spain in 1820, internal turmoil and armed conflicts against external powers greatly limited economic development. The coming to power of General Porfirio Diaz in 1877 marked the beginning of an unprecedented period of 3 political stability that set the stage for growth and the development of the financial system. Diaz's rein lasted until 1911. (Appendix 1 describes the historical setting in greater detail.)
In the early 1900s, as many as 29 Mexican banks issued demandable notes that by law had to be redeemed from the issuer for specie (gold or silver coin) at par. Banks of issue were the predominant type of depository institution, although their importance declined in the first decade, apparently because of the rising use of checkable deposits that paid interest (see Rosenzweig 1965) . Banks of issue accounted for 92 percent of assets of chartered banks in 1897, and for 84 percent of their assets in 1907. These figures understate the declining importance of banks of issue to some degree because several unregulated depository institutions were established in the early 1900s, but the available information suggests that the banks of issue were still the predominant banking institutions.
Since the early 1890s, all issuers of demandable notes had been operating under federal bank charters. There were two types of banks of issue, "city" banks and "state" or "local" banks.
The two city banks were based in Mexico City and were the country's two largest banks, accounting for 80 percent of the assets of the banking system in 1897. Banco Nacional de Mexico was the larger of the two, accounting for 50 percent of the assets of the banking system that year. Banco de Londres y Mexico was the other city bank. City banks were not subject to branching restrictions, whereas state banks were. State banks were not allowed to branch outside specific regions (that sometimes overlapped) and were prohibited from operating in Mexico City.
In 1896, a federal bank law was passed that succeeded, among other things, in subjecting nearly all state banks to common legal requirements. (City banks continued to operate under the terms of their charters when in conflict with the law.) The law also made nearly uniform the 4 3 Article 967 of the 1884 Commercial Code (see Lelo de Larrea 1884) provides the only available detailed description of the steps that an issuer had to follow before putting its notes into circulation that I could find. Although the section relating to banking was removed from the commercial code several years later, it appears that the same steps continued to be followed. physical characteristics of all bank notes. Notes had to state the date of the issue and carry the signatures of one of the directors of the bank, its cashier or manager, and a federal government bank inspector. (Banco Nacional's notes bore the signatures of two federal government inspectors.) The minimum denomination note was 1 peso for Banco Nacional and 5 pesos for all other banks. In 1895, GDP per capita was 67 pesos. Thus, a 5-peso note was not something that the typical Mexican worker would have used in day-to-day transactions.
A bank of issue could put its notes into circulation by accepting specie or making a loan.
Before an issuer could put notes into circulation, it had to follow a number of steps. The available information suggest that notes were shipped to the issuer, and then were sent on to Mexico City after a federal bank inspector was satisfied that the bank had complied with legal requirements. The notes were passed through the federal tax office (Oficina de Timbre), a part of the federal Treasury (Secretaria de Hacienda), where a note tax was paid and the notes were stamped.
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Under the 1896 law (as well as prior to that law), notes were backed by the assets of the bank, which consisted essentially of specie reserves and risky assets. While a bank did not have to back its notes in full by specie reserves, Mexican bank law was designed to make bank notes as safe as was thought possible. Notes had a first lien on the assets of the bank, and banks had to adhere to other legal restrictions designed to protect note holders. Any issuer that could not redeem its notes at par faced liquidation. However, a bank branch was not obligated to redeem at 5 par notes put into circulation by another branch of the same bank.
Prior to the passage of the 1896 law, only a few banks of issue operated in Mexico because issuing notes required a federal bank charter, which was difficult to obtain. Moreover, a charter to be a bank of issue was of uncertain legal validity because it conflicted with Banco Nacional's 1884 charter. Banco Nacional, the federal government's fiscal agent, had been founded in 1881 as a result of the federal government's efforts to attract capital from abroad. Banco Nacional's foreign associations and the bank's efforts to enforce its special powers fueled considerable resentment against the bank throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century.
(Appendix 1 discusses these circumstances further.)
In 1896, the legal dilemma was finally resolved, paving the way for the passage of a new banking law for state banks. The 1896 law relaxed entry into the business of issuing notes for state banks, but preserved their branching restrictions and resulted in there being more favorable tax treatment given to city bank notes (see Appendix 2). Tax considerations and minimum capital requirements essentially restricted entry to no more than one bank per state in most cases (see Appendix 2). By 1903, nearly every state had one chartered bank of issue based in that state, and three states had two; the number of state banks rose from 7 to 25 between 1896 and 1903, and peaked at 27 in 1905. Tables 1a and 1b list the state banks that received federal charters before 1896 (all of them between 1888 and 1891) and under the 1896 law.
III. Origins of the Banco Central System
By the late 1890s, a manufacturing sector was emerging and interregional trade was growing rapidly, spurred by the development of transportation and communications systems and the suppression of interstate tariffs (alcabadas) in 1896. Less than one thousand kilometers in 6 railroad lines existed in 1880. By 1900, a 12 thousand kilometer system extended over various parts of the country from the central hub in Mexico City. Cargo transported by rail rose from 0.2 million tons in 1880 to 7.5 million tons in 1900. 4 By the turn of the century, for instance, Mexico had a thriving textile industry that was heavily concentrated in the Mexico City region, mostly in the Federal District and Puebla, that received shipments of raw materials from other regions (Casasus 1905 ; see also Haber 1991).
The rise in interregional trade and in the number of state banks resulted in more state bank notes traveling greater distances. A consequence of these developments, as Casasus (1908) observed, was that state bank notes exchanged for specie at discounts when they were far from the issuer. Casasus observed that the discounts in Mexico City were higher for the banks in the more remote states. In contrast, all indications are that the notes of the city banks circulated throughout the country at par. Both the law and Banco Nacional's charter explicitly stated that a branch of a bank was not required to accept at par note issued by another branch of the same bank. Since 1893, though, Banco Nacional had made it a policy to do so whenever possible.
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The fact that, since 1887, only Banco Nacional's notes could be accepted by treasury agents helped support the demand for its notes, and thus boosted their value, especially since acceptance -7 -6 Under Banco Nacional's 1881 charter, the bank's notes were legal tender for federal payments, but federal treasury agents were not required to accept its notes at par until its charter was renegotiated in 1884. From 1884 to 1887, federal tax agents also accepted at par the notes of another financial institution (Monte de Piedad) that had suspended convertibility during the crisis period of 1883-84. Banco Nacional's 1884 charter stipulated that Monte de Piedad would retire its notes. 7 According to Gurza (op. cit.) , the Banco Central arrangement had other advantages, such as not charging members commissions on other clearings, as had been the case with previous correspondents. Conant (1911) some of its capital from its members, it could also issue shares to outside investors. With the federal government's help, more than half of the bank's capital was raised from an private placement that will be described further below. After raising one half of the authorized capital, the bank began operating on February 15, 1899. Gurza (1905) and Casasus (op. cit.) make it clear that it was intended that Banco Central redeem local bank notes in Mexico City at par.
7 Gurza (op. cit. p. 49) , for instance, tells us that state banks that devised the note redemption system "understood that their circulation could not -8 - 8 The belief that Banco Nacional's actions or even those of Banco de Londres were predatory was never stated explicitly. However, Gurza (op. cit. p. 48) , quotes one anonymous observer who said that the idea of the Government was 'that the new national banking system would reduce the exploitation of the great banks of the Federal District...'. Barrera Lavalle (op. cit. p. 207) recounts conflicts that arose in the states of Veracruz and Yucatan when the branches of Banco Nacional returned local bank notes for redemption. The banks were located in these and in other states that had customs collection points were "at the mercy of the agencies and branches of Banco Nacional". be sufficiently wide and productive unless their notes were admitted at par in the capital of the Republic." Gurza thus understood that having an agent that would redeem bank notes at par in the country's financial and commercial center increased the desirability of state bank notes and added to state banks' profitability. Thus, the BCS was a collusive mechanism for extracting rent from the city banks.
In the course of its business, Banco Nacional had at times redeemed state bank notes for specie at par, but its prompt return of state bank notes for redemption was clearly unpopular (Barrera Lavalle 1909 p. 207).
8 If Banco Central had not been created, Banco Nacional probably would have continued to act as a broker for state bank notes. By returning notes quickly to the issuer for redemption, Banco Nacional acted as a check on state banks and in this sense had a stabilizing effect on the banking system. However, Banco Central seemed less vulnerable to the criticism that it was anti-competitively constraining state bank note issuance. Its statutes prohibited it from operating in states where it had a correspondent relationship (which was in all states that had a state bank) and it could not issue notes.
III. Experience under the BCS and Reform
According to Conant (1911) , the BCS seemed to work very well. Conant credited the system for enabling state bank notes to circulate throughout the country at par in the early -9 -9 Federal bank examiners often noted the discount rates of bank drafts ("giros") on distant localities, which suggests that the Banco Central System was not intended to and did not support par check clearing. 10 Help in 1908 had come in the form of the creation of the Caja de Asistencia para Obras de Fomento e Irrigacion, whose government-guaranteed bonds were marketed abroad in the fall of that year. The federal government, Banco Central, Banco Nacional, and two other large banks held portions of the Caja's shares (the bank was capitalized at 10 million pesos). The proceeds from the bond sales, which totaled about 44 million pesos, were swapped at par for loans of the four banks that presumably were not likely to be repaid in full. 44 million pesos amounted to 20 percent of the paid in capital and reserves of the banking system as of March 1908, defined to include banks of issue and regulated depository institutions.
1900s. 9 The broadening of the BCS in 1904 to include a limited mutual assistance arrangement added more protection to note holders.
The BCS only survived a financial crisis in 1907-08, however, because of the financial assistance that was provided by Banco Nacional and the Mexican government. The crisis was marked in part by the restructuring of two banks in the state of Yucatan by Banco Central and Banco Nacional and from an apparent injection of new capital by shareholders of Banco Nacional (discussed below). Banco Nacional also responded by agreeing to accept at par the notes of two other state banks (Banco de Campeche and Banco de Michoacan) that were in trouble (Maurer 1997 Venustiano Carranza in 1916, efforts to reform the banking system began to make some headway. A banking commission was set up to determine which banks, which were in a quite sorry state by this point, had sufficient specie reserves to remain in operation. The ultimate objective, however, was much more far-reaching, to create a government-owned bank with a monopoly on the power to issue notes.
It was believed by Manero and others who were intimately involved in the reform process that many banks had engaged in fraudulent behavior and had been managed poorly, and as a result ran into serious problems before the revolution. One cannot attribute this view entirely to the strained relationship between banks and the Carranza government at that time, as this view had been expressed by Mexico's finance minister before the revolution. Kemmerer (1940 p.19) , too, tells us that "Mexico was a country whose banking laws had been carefully drawn, but not so carefully enforced. Partly as a result of banking abuses, and partly as a result of the political and economic disturbances of the period, some of the banks found themselves in a rather unstable position during the early part of the period." Manero and Cerda (1997) were more specific in -11 -that the state banks were the main objectives of their criticism in this regard.
There are only a couple of cases in which there is any direct evidence of fraud or highly questionable banking practices. Perhaps the best documented case is that of Banco de
Campeche, which was a small bank. In 1907, it was revealed that loans to its main shareholder, Jose Castellot, accounted for the lion's share of its capital (Rosenzweig op. cit. p. 853 ).
Rosenzweig's account of the case suggests that Castellot, who was governor of the state of Campeche, never made any attempt to repay his obligations. After being subject to what was obviously weak regulatory pressure to shape up, the bank was finally closed in 1911.
Nonetheless, the belief that the banking system had suffered from behavioral problems before the revolution ran strong (see Manero op.cit. Zarazaga (1993) studies a similar incentive problem in a model with independent issuers of a common currency under a fiat money regime.
V. The Working of the BCS
Regarding the BCS, Manero opined:
It was to be hoped that being the local banks possessing...twothirds of the total capital, that the administration of Central would be totally favorable to their interests. But it was not thus...
Actually, it does not appear that state banks had collectively this large a stake in Banco
Central for more than a brief period. Even if they had, one should have expected a fundamental tension among members of a fixed exchange rate system for bank notes, which is what the BCS was essentially intended to be. With notes by member banks being exchangeable at a fixed rate and for specie at par, discounts would no longer signal the creditworthiness of the borrower.
Each bank had an incentive to exploit this informational problem for its own gain at the expense of others by issuing more of its notes than what would otherwise have been the case. Eventually, Banco Central's reserves would be exhausted by demands for redemption, and the system would thus collapse. If the BCS was to be viable, there had to be some mechanism for constraining the behavior of member banks.
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The BCS was similar to the Suffolk Bank System of New England in that they both involved an agent that redeemed member bank notes at par. The Suffolk System appears to have been the most successful of the bank note redemption systems that operated in the United States before the Civil War, making it a standard for comparison against the BCS. Calomiris and Kahn (op. cit.) provide evidence that the discipline instilled by the Suffolk Bank enabled New England banks to operate more efficiently and enabled their notes to circulate at smaller discounts -13 - 12 The loan rate rose if the balance surpassed 10 percent of the capital the member had paid into Banco Central. 12 Banco Central's accounts with local banks were balanced once every 6 months (according to Conant). The Suffolk Bank, in contrast, at first required payment in specie.
It later allowed overdrafts, but loans had to be repaid each week. As the Suffolk Bank System evolved, the Suffolk Bank had daily clearings and put other restrictions on the volume of notes that could be cleared in one day. According to Calomiris (1989) , payments arrangements that allowed overdrafts tended to collapse quickly. However, overdrafts reduced the gain from and -14 - 13 The capital requirement for membership was increased in January 1903 from 5 percent of a member's own capital to 10 percent. In early 1904, however, the requirement was modified such that a member could purchase stock equal to 10 percent of the book value of its capital as of December 1901. The combined equity (book value) of the 19 state banks that existed in June 1901 rose from 26 million pesos at that point to 56 million pesos in June 1907.
thus the incentive to "overissue", since they amounted to paying interest on notes. It is not clear whether the BCS would have been a less effective constraint than the Suffolk Bank System in this respect, if access to the overdraft feature had been left to Banco Central's discretion.
Under Banco Central's charter, members could not sell their stakes in Banco Central for ten years. This went some of the way towards alleviating the incentive problem, forcing a member bank to balance its short-term gains from "inflating" against its longer-run interest in ensuring the viability of the system. Each bank was required to hold a small stake in Banco Central. 13 Judging from Mexican government records, major investors of some banks held considerable stakes in Banco Central, but this does not appear to have been the case for all banks.
An important feature of the Suffolk Bank System was the Suffolk Bank's use of nonprice mechanisms, including the threat of suspension of a member from the arrangement, to help induce good behavior. Conant notes that Banco Central could refuse "notes which [were] presented in abnormal quantities or with suspicious intent" (op. cit. p. 43). However, following an incident that occurred in 1900 involving Banco Yucateco, suspending any member from the par redemption arrangement does not appear to have been considered a politically feasible option. Banco Yucateco's case is an important one, because the bank was relatively large. The
case also provides what seems to be the best direct evidence of a bank that did try to exploit the system at the expense of other members.
-15 - Carosso (1987) , the three -16 - 14 The deal, writes Carosso, took 15 months to conclude, in part because the Mexican government was holding out for better terms with rival firms. Ultimately, Bleichroeder and company won the account, and the bonds were marketed in the United States and Europe as the 5 Percent External Consolidated Gold Loan of 1899. investment houses had been working together to secure a lead role in the Mexican government's restructuring of bonds held abroad as of early 1898, and so their acquisition of shares in Banco Central may have been made to sweeten the deal.
Va. Banco Yucateco and the BCS
14 As a result of a agreement reached in early 1901, the Bleichroeder et al stake passed into the hands of the state banks, with each state bank's contribution being in proportion to its own capital. Exactly how the money was made available is not clear, but BY's management stated that "the terms of payment were flexible" (minutes 1/29/1902), suggesting that it came in the form of a loan. Gurza (op. cit. p. 51) also suggests that the government's role in the arrangement was quite critical:
Although the law... explicitly prohibits that establishment of said agencies in the Federal District [for redeeming state bank notes], the Government not only was not opposed that Banco Central deceitfully had this character, but also, understanding that the union of the local banks was a progress in our banking system, favored the idea of the creation of Banco Central, granting its charter, facilitating its establishment, and giving material help and very marked help when later the new bank hit difficulties, owing to the foreign shareholders wanting to follow a policy counter to the interests of the local banks (italics added for emphasis).
In the years following the 1900 incident, BY was not subject to any further suspensions of convertibility by Banco Central, but its troubles did not end. BY's notes outstanding peaked at 8 million pesos at the end of 1903, but then steadily declined. It had only 2 million pesos in notes outstanding in mid-1907, despite various mechanisms that had been adopted to boost the demand for state bank notes in general and for its notes in particular. In November 1903, BY, Banco Mercantil de Yucatan, and Banco Nacional agreed to accept each others' notes at par -17 -15 "El Crédito en Yucatan", El Economista Mexicano, May 28, 1904. 16 Member banks would send specie to Banco Central, so that "the amount thus placed in the hands of the Banco Central [would be] employed in redeeming at par the notes of the establishment which is threatened." (Rosenzweig op. cit. p. 828) Assistance was limited to 50 percent of the book value of capital of the bank in need and to 2 percent of the book value of the capital of the contributing bank.
(BY's annual report to shareholders 2/12/1904). The following April, however, BY notified Banco Nacional that it could not redeem its notes for specie (Cerda op. cit.) , and asked for a loan. Banco Nacional's senior executive body postponed its decision. In late May, a newspaper reported that the notes of BY were accepted at par by Banco Mercantil de Yucatan, but observed that the "notes are not exchanged regularly and balances build up".
15 Although the story does not explicitly say that Banco Mercantil de Yucatan was accumulating BY's notes, it seems reasonable to infer that this had been the case.
As these events unfolded, While BY's notes in circulation continued to decline after 1904, its other liabilities did not. Bank balance sheets did not distinguish among various types of non-bank note liabilities in any meaningful way, so it is impossible to know for sure how BY obtained its funding.
However, Banco Nacional had provided each of the Yucateco banks with sizeable loans in 1906 (Cerda op. cit.) . In the bank's 1906 report to shareholders, BY stated that it "suspended the circulation of...notes in the Capital of the Republic", adding that it could not hope to keep its notes in circulation as long as they were being sent immediately to Banco Central for redemption. Management also suggested the move had come in response to official pressure (2/19/1907, 1906 shareholders report) .
By 1907 economic conditions in the Yucatan peninsula had deteriorated to the point where both BY and Banco Mercantil de Yucatan were in trouble. 17 In mid-1907, according to Barcelo Quintal (1986) , the French financiers that held a large stake in Banco Nacional had also acquired a stake in BY and replaced the management of both of the Yucateco banks. In early -19 -1908, the two banks were merged. Barcelo Quintal's characterization of the event suggests that the merged bank was recapitalized with the help of French investors.
Vb. Further Evidence of Government Involvement in the BCS
The Cerda (op. cit.) notes that beginning around 1904, Banco Nacional became more active in providing loans to other banks. Banco Nacional was subject to pressures from the Mexican government to provide certain loans from time to time, which, according to Maurer (1997) , it mostly resisted. In mid-June, however, Banco Nacional granted a loan to Banco Central for one and a half million pesos two weeks after it had refused an earlier request for a smaller loan -20 - 18 Since specie reserves included holdings of other banks' notes before 1901, the increase thereafter is exaggerated to some degree. (Cerda op. cit. p. 430) . Government bank records suggest that a correspondent relationship existed between the two banks, and thus, Banco Central's request for a line of credit "to facilitate the daily exchange of documents" suggested that it was seeking overdraft protection (Cerda op. cit. p. 430) The line of credit was renewed at the end of the year.
Cerda does not mention whether there was any discussion of official pressure on the bank to provide the loan to Banco Central, but its timing and the fact that Joaquim Casasus had requested the renewal of the line of credit suggests that this was the case. Casasus was intimately involved in the BCS, having represented the local banks in negotiations with the Bleichroeder syndicate and acting as a member of its executive board. Casasus was also closely associated with the Diaz government. A former legislator, Casasus had presided over the commission that drafted the 1896 bank law, and fulfilled other roles during his distinguished career, including that of the Mexican Ambassador to the United States around 1905.
Despite the suggestion of official intervention to help Banco Central, Table 2 
VI. Evidence of Behavioral Problems Under the System
The evidence seems quite compelling that official intervention blunted the disciplinary role of Banco Central in the system, but how severe resulting behavioral problems were remains unclear. Comparing measures of risk of the two Yucateco banks, which were exposed to the same underlying risks, shed some light into the issue. As seen in Table 3 , particularly before 1904, the ratio of notes to specie reserves and to (book) capital were higher for BY than for Banco Mercantil de Yucatan. Despite the difficulties in interpretation, the same comparison was made with total liabilities in the numerator. BY's total liabilities to specie reserves and to capital again often exceeded that of its Yucateco competitor. That is, abstracting from events affecting both banks (and marked changes in these ratios suggests that these events were important), Banco Yucateco pursued a relatively risky strategy.
Risk measures of all state banks were also compared with the two city banks. Tables 4a   and 4b compare note-to-specie ratios and note-to-market capital ratios of the state banks with those of Banco Nacional and Banco de Londres. After 1901, state banks tended to have higher ratios of notes to specie and higher ratios of specie to market capital than did the city banks.
Total liabilities of banks were also looked at (results not shown), even though Banco Nacional's role as a federal treasury agent makes it hard to interpret the results. If one ignores Banco -22 -Nacional (whose risk was the highest by this measure), state banks tended to have higher ratios of liabilities to specie and to market capital than did Banco de Londres. The ratios are not reported after 1904 because Banco Nacional's role in management of the bimetallic standard adopted in 1905 would make the results hard to interpret.
Because it could be that state banks tended to be more risky because they were more vulnerable than were the city banks to underlying economic conditions (because city banks were better diversified), an attempt was made to account for bank-specific risk with panel estimations.
The observations were from December of each year. Four measures of bank risk for which data are available over the 1897 to 1904 period were used as dependent variables: notes relative to specie, total liabilities relative to specie, notes relative to book capital, and total liabilities relative to book capital. These measures were regressed on bank dummies, time dummies, and a dummy variable that was equal to one if an observation represented a state bank after 1900 and zero otherwise (statebank01). If the coefficient associated with statebank01 was positive and significant, it was interpreted as meaning that state banks tended to be riskier after 1900 than city banks.
The results weakly support the hypothesis that even after controlling for year and bank specific factors, state banks tended to have higher levels of risk after 1900. Although the coefficient on the interactive dummy was always positive, the only case in which it was not significantly different from zero was when note/specie was the dependent variable. The lack of statistical significance probably reflects the tests' low power; only two banks are alternatives to the state banks (with varied in number from 7 in 1897 to a peak of about 25). 
VII. Conclusion
Overall, the evidence suggests that government intervention muted Banco Central's effectiveness as a source of discipline on state bank behavior. By 1908, Mexico's government had come to the conclusion that the BCS was in need of reform. Among several amendments to the 1896 law that were approved in June of that year by congress was one that addressed the note -24 -19 Casasus (op. cit p. 190) suggested that all banks, except for Banco Nacional, meet once or twice per month in Mexico City to exchange their notes. He also suggested that the notes of Banco Nacional or drafts on Mexico City payable by Banco Central could be used to settle adverse balances. exchange process. The amendment stated that banks of issue would "periodically exchange the notes of other banks in their possession and shall, in the absence of express agreement between the parties, pay the balances in cash" (Conant op. cit. p. 177) . Further details were to be forthcoming, but the reform initiative obviously lost favor during the revolution.
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Because BCS was government mandated and government influenced, the Mexican experience provides little insight into the viability of private payments systems. How costly government involvement in the BCS ultimately turned out to be (in terms of muting members' incentives to act conservatively) is impossible to determine, since even a well-designed private payments system may have had trouble coping with the crisis period of 1907-08. The most likely source of problems during this period was the government's decision to adhere to the bimetallic standard in the face of adverse shocks (including wide variations in the gold to silver price ratio). A closer look at this and other causes of Mexico's banking problems in the early 1900s is left, however, for future research.
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